电子商务系列研讨会（32）：高强

时间：2021-09-03  阅读量：934次

电子商务系列研讨会（32）：高强

为进一步深入学术交流，增进学术氛围，应电子商务系邀请，纽约城市大学巴鲁克学院助理教授高强将于2021年9月17日（周五）在腾讯会议上进行线上学术交流并作学术报告。高强助理教授将结合其最新研究做题为“Third-Party Skill Certification in Online Labor Markets”的报告。欢迎感兴趣的教师及研究生参加。

报告题目：Third-Party Skill Certification in Online Labor Markets

报告时间：2021/9/17（周五） 08:30-11:00

报告地点：腾讯会议 155 279 867

【报告人简介】

高强，博士，现任纽约城市大学巴鲁克学院商业分析助理教授。高强博士的主要研究兴趣主要在Online Finance, particularly crowdfunding; Online Labor Market; Online Community, including user-generated contents (UGC)。他的科研论文在国际顶级或著名的期刊发表，如Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Information Systems Research，Communications of the Association for Information Systems，Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology，Journal of nanoparticle research。

高强博士目前担任信息系统顶级期刊或会议如Information Systems Research, Management Information Systems Quarterly, Management Science, Production and Operations Management, Decision Science, Information & Management, European Journal of Information Systems, Decision Support Systems, International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS)等特邀评审。

【报告摘要】Third-party skill certification is widely used in many markets, online and offline, to address the ubiquitous information asymmetry between workers and employers. In online labor markets, however, the usefulness of third-party certification is not yet fully established in that some leading platforms tout its effectiveness whereas others abandon it altogether. It is unclear whether such certifications exert a meaningful influence on the recruitment decisions of employers (i.e., buyers) and whether they reveal the quality of employees (i.e., workers). In addition, there is no ex-ante theoretical consensus about whether certification attempts should be offered free of charge. Using a comprehensive dataset from one of the largest online labor markets, we first study whether certifications are desirable for employers when they make recruitment decisions. We then examine whether certifications actually do reflect worker quality (therefore serving as a valid economic signal) by examining their ex-post performance after being hired. We further examine how zero-cost certification tests affect the above relationships by exploiting data surrounding a policy change on the platform. Our findings show that employers do prefer workers with certifications over those without, and justifiably so: Workers with certifications do outperform those without certifications. Certifications are especially helpful for new workers in obtaining jobs, especially workers who have not yet accumulated ratings. Contrary to some theoretical arguments, offering certification tests free of charge actually reduces the signaling value of certifications: It negatively affects employers’ preference for certified workers.

撰稿人： 杨弦                               审核：宋晓龙